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Abstract
Background: In both the US and Japan, the patient isolation policy for leprosy /Hansen's disease
(HD) was preserved along with the isolation facilities, long after it had been proven to be
scientifically unnecessary. This delayed policy termination caused a deprivation of civil liberties of
the involuntarily confined patients, the fostering of social stigmas attached to the disease, and an
inefficient use of health resources. This article seeks to elucidate the political process which
hindered timely policy changes congruent with scientific advances.
Methods: Examination of historical materials, supplemented by personal interviews. The role that
science played in the process of policy making was scrutinized with particular reference to the
Garbage Can model.
Results: From the vantage of history, science remained instrumental in all period in the sense that
it was not the primary objective for which policy change was discussed or intended, nor was it the
principal driving force for policy change. When the argument arose, scientific arguments were
employed to justify the patient isolation policy. However, in the early post-WWII period, issues
were foregrounded and agendas were set as the inadvertent result of administrative reforms.
Subsequently, scientific developments were more or less ignored due to concern about adverse
policy outcomes. Finally, in the 1980s and 1990s, scientific arguments were used instrumentally to
argue against isolation and for the termination of residential care.
Conclusion: Contrary to public expectations, health policy is not always rational and scientifically
justified. In the process of policy making, the role of science can be limited and instrumental. Policy
change may require the opening of policy windows, as a result of convergence of the problem,
policy, and political streams, by effective exercise of leadership. Scientists and policymakers should
be attentive enough to the political context of policies.
Background
Leprosy, or Hansen's disease (HD), is a chronic infectious
disease caused by Mycobacterium leprae[1]. The disease has
been known since ancient times: The origin of the word
leprosy dates back to Greek and Latin[2]. Over a long time
period, the disease can be disfiguring, and societies have
stigmatized victims of the disease. This attribute is deeply
discrediting since the stigmatized individual is disquali-
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fied from full social acceptance. Leprosy was thus
dreaded, not because it killed, but because it left one alive
with no hope[3,4]. After Armauer Hansen's discovery of
the bacteria in 1873, the disease became feared as a conta-
gion, and segregation was recommended for prevention.
The advent of effective drugs in the 1940s drastically
changed the course of disease, and in many countries,
patient isolation was deemed unnecessary and termi-
nated. However, some countries that practiced patient iso-
lation experienced difficulties in changing their policies,
abolishing leprosaria and reintegrating the patients into
the community[5]. As a result, prolonged policies caused
the institutionalization of patients for a period longer
than scientific knowledge justified.
Public policy termination is often perceived as the final
outcome of a political, but highly rational, policy process.
When a policy's objectives are reached and maintained, its
relevance and applicability should be reconsidered and, if
found redundant, outmoded, or dysfunctional, the policy
should be terminated[6]. Termination might occur with
either a bang or a whimper: public programs and policies
may end suddenly, perhaps after a lengthy resistance, or
they may end slowly after a long-term decline in the
resources with which they are [7,8]sustained. In either
case, when termination does not take place properly, the
policy may cause harmful effects, either materially or ide-
ologically, rather than beneficial ones[9]. Adopting a pol-
icy to terminate a law is always a struggle presenting a
number of obstacles, especially. Those posed by agents
with vested interests[10]. To overcome various political
hurdles, a set of effective political strategies is sometimes
required, as well as political maneuvering by those skilled
at policy [11-13]termination.
There seems to be a general expectation that the introduc-
tion, maintenance and termination of health and medical
policies are deliberate, meaning both rational and scien-
tifically justifiable. However, the relationship between sci-
ence and policy is actually quite complex. It is rarely a
linear and rational one in which science finds and estab-
lishes the facts and then policymakers incorporate them
to solve social problems. This study examines the history
of leprosy control policy in the US and Japan, focusing
especially on the national legislative changes concerning
patient isolation. It seeks to examine the functions of sci-
ence in policy change, in this case the abolition of the
long-standing patient isolation policy. Importance of
favorable political context, along with skillful policy
entrepreneurs, is then addressed.
Methods
Materials
To examine the process of policy making concerning the
isolation of patients with leprosy / HD, a comprehensive
search and collection of historical documents were con-
ducted both in the US and Japan. After a thorough search
of archives of public records, both printed and on-line,
using the keywords leprosy and Hansen's disease, relevant
documents were exhaustively collected from libraries, lep-
rosaria/sanatoria, offices of patients' organizations, and
the museum of Hansen's disease (Carville and Tokyo) in
each country. Sources include the Research Library of the
National Archives and Record Administration (Washing-
ton)[14,15], the libraries at Louisiana State University
(Baton Rouge) and Harvard University (Cambridge and
Boston), and the National Diet Library (Tokyo). Data-
bases of medical articles, such as MEDLINE[16] and
ICHUSHI[17], were utilized to search for publications on
leprosy/HD. Other types of documents and books, such as
theses, essays and recollections, were also gathered. Sup-
plementary interviews were then conducted during 2000–
2004 with leprosaria directors and physicians, administra-
tors, and patients, both past and present, in the US and
Japan.
The Garbage Can model of policy making
The observation of politics involves making observations
conform to sets of assumptions, which are called models.
These models help delineate the relationships among
conditions and patterns in political life. The Garbage Can
model of policy making was proposed by Cohen et al[18],
and further developed by Kingdon[19] as a contrast to lin-
ear, comprehensive, and rational models[20]. This model
assumes that policy windows open only when the process
streams of problems, policies and politics converge, sepa-
rately and independent of each other. In such a conver-
gence, problems are brought to the attention of people in
and around government by systemic indicators, by focus-
ing events like crisis and disasters, and by feedback on the
operation of current programs. Alternate policy proposals
are developed from the many possible ideas floated by
those both in and out of government. The proposals that
survive to achieve serious consideration must meet several
criteria, including technical feasibility, a fit with dominant
values and the current national mood, budgetary worka-
bility and political support. Political support may be
affected by a variety of influences including swings of
national mood, administrative or legislative turnover,
interest group campaigns, and social movements.
In this context, policy windows are the opportunities to
push forward one's preferred proposal or conception of
the problem. These windows of opportunity in policy
making can open either as a result of happenings in the
political stream or by the development of compelling
problems. In the Garbage Can model, solutions and prob-
lems have equal status as separate streams in the system,
and the popularity of a given solution at a given point in
time often influences which problems are focused on. InBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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other words, collections of choices are looking for prob-
lems, issues and feelings are looking for decision situa-
tions in which they might be aired, solutions are looking
for issues to which they might be the answers, and deci-
sion makers are looking for work. Agendas are set by prob-
lems or politics and alternatives are generated in the
policy stream. So, outcomes are heavily dependent on the
coupling of the streams. Sometimes in this process, policy
entrepreneurs – people who invest their resources in
pushing their pet proposals or problems – are responsible,
not only for prompting important people to pay atten-
tion, but also for coupling solutions to problems and for
setting both problems and solutions in a functional polit-
ical context.
This Garbage Can model was sometimes employed to
explain the dynamics of policy making in the areas other
than health care, and proved to be a powerful analytical
tool[21]. In this study, the courses of events were analyzed
through this model, and important factors for and obsta-
cles to linking science and policy were examined.
With respect to leprosy policy, history after WWII is
divided into three periods. Period I covers the time period
of the late 1940s through 1950s, when the advent of new
drugs could have opened the policy windows in both
countries. Related events in Japan seem to have lagged
about five years behind those in the US, presumably due
to the delayed introduction of those drugs. Period II rep-
resents the time in the 1960s and 1970s, when true legis-
lative policy change did not occur, but incremental
administrative actions were taken. Finally, Period III
encompasses the 1980s and 1990s, when the policy of
patient isolation was legislatively abolished in both the
US and Japan. Relevant facts preceding Period I are also
succinctly presented.
Results
Isolation of leprosy patients in the United States
US background
In 1865, Hawaii established a policy for the quarantine
and isolation of HD patients. A leper settlement was
established at Kalaupapa on Molokai island, and the
Kalihi Receiving Station was opened on Honolulu to diag-
nose cases and provide emergency treatment[22]. In
1873, when Mycobacterium leprae was discovered by
Hansen and leprosy was thus proved to be a contagion,
the seclusion of patients in their homes or in hospitals
was advocated for disease prevention[23]. By 1894, Loui-
siana had established a leprosarium, and several other
states, such as New York and California, had also intro-
duced similar isolation policies for HD patients[24]. The
First International Congress on Leprosy held in Berlin in
1897 recommended isolation as the appropriate policy
measure against leprosy. In 1909, the U.S. government
built another leper colony in the Philippines on the Island
of Culion.
After several national and state surveys of HD patients, the
need for a national policy to control HD and the desirabil-
ity of patient isolation were discussed repeatedly during
the 1890s. The first legislation, passed in 1898, authorized
a thorough investigation of leprosy. A commission was
appointed, and based on its recommendation, legislation
was introduced that allowed for the establishment of a
national leprosarium for the segregation of lepers with the
goal of preventing the spread of leprosy in the United
States[25]. It is worth noting that scientists were never
unanimous about the necessity of isolation. Scientific
publications at the time described HD as a relatively non-
contagious disease[26].
After succeeding reports and debates, legislation was
passed in 1917 that provided for purchase of a site and
receipt of any person afflicted with leprosy who presented
himself or herself for care, detention, and treatment, or
who might be apprehended under authority of the United
States Quarantine Acts[27]. The American Academy of
Medicine, the American Medical Association, and the
American Dermatological Association expressed their
support for the isolation policy, arguing that patient isola-
tion serves for disease control and patient treatment, as
well as protection of patients from social stigma and ostra-
cism. The 1917 legislation also directed that public health
employees assigned to the institution be paid one and
one-half times the regular pay due to the disagreeable and
dangerous nature of the service[28].
Having failed to locate a new site, in 1921 the U.S. govern-
ment took over the Louisiana Leper Home in Carville,
Louisiana, and the United States Public Health Service
(PHS) opened the US Marine Hospital Number 66 as a
National Leprosarium[29]. The rules "Regulations gov-
erning the care of lepers: regulations for the government
of leprosaria and for the apprehension, detention, treat-
ment, and release of lepers" were drawn up by the Sur-
geon General in 1922 to implement the 1917 legislation.
The 1922 rules reiterated the admission options (volun-
tary or involuntary), prohibited patients from leaving the
sanitarium grounds, and provided that patients shall not
"hold communication" with patients of the opposite sex.
The rules also outlined a procedure for discharge of
patients, which included a period of one year of special
observation for any signs of leprotic retrogression after
medical tests showed no signs of the disease. After this
year, the patients were requested to appear before a board
of three or more medical officers who might pronounce
the patient to be no longer a menace to public health[30].BMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
Page 4 of 16
(page number not for citation purposes)
The institution was gradually expanded in the year 1933,
having 65 rooms and outpatient facilities in 1941. By
1945, there were 369 inpatients[31]. During those years,
there was no really effective treatment of the disease. Most
of those at the facility were involuntarily admitted (only
15% of admissions between 1930 and 1945 were report-
edly voluntary)[32].
US period I (1940 through 1950))
In 1941, Dr. Guy Faget at the National Leprosarium
started a clinical trial of Promin, a sulfone drug, for the
treatment of HD. Its beneficial effects became rapidly
known and were reported within a few years in leading
medical journals, such as Public Health Reports and Jour-
nal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)[33].
Other forms of sulfone drugs, Diasone and Promazole,
were also developed and replaced the traditional HD
treatment of applying chaulmoogra oil[34]. The interna-
tional academic community paid close attention, and the
1946 Conference on Leprosy in Rio de Janeiro reported
significant advances from the introduction of the sulfone
group of drugs[35].
The enactment of the Public Health Services Act of
1944[36] could have provided a forum for discussion and
revision of the US HD policy. Parts D and G of the Act,
however, literally duplicated the 1917 Act, apparently
without discussion. As before, its Section 331 states –
"that the Service (PHS) shall, in accordance with regula-
tions, receive into any hospital of the Service suitable for
his accommodation any person afflicted with leprosy who
presents himself for care, detention, or treatment, or who
may be apprehended under section 332 (regulation) or
361 (quarantine) of this Act, and any person afflicted with
leprosy duly consigned to the care of the Service by the
proper health authority of any State, Territory, or the Dis-
trict of Columbia. The Surgeon General is authorized,
upon the request of any health authority, to send for any
person within the jurisdiction of such authority who is
afflicted with leprosy and to convey such person to the
appropriate hospital for detention and treatment."
Only a year later, in 1945, the American Public Health
Association advised against isolating people with leprosy.
It was by then well established that the majority of the
population had a natural immunity to leprosy, and that it
was only mildly contagious to the rest. Since the relative
infectiousness of the two types of leprosy had been meas-
ured by epidemiological studies, which demonstrated the
very low infectiousness of the tuberculoid type, experts
insisted that only open (infectious) cases, if any, required
isolation[37]. However, at that point, scientists were again
not unanimous concerning patient isolation policy. Dr.
Faget, who should have known the effects of sulfones bet-
ter than anyone else, wrote in Public Health Reports that
the only reliable means to eradicate leprosy is isolation.
Dr. G. W. McCoy, an ex-official of the PHS and Dean of
the Louisiana State University Medical School, on the
other hand, recommended that since infectivity varies
depending on clinical types, the universal isolation policy
should be abandoned. He stressed that when there is
room to question infectiousness, it should be used to
serve patients (meaning to protect patients' liberty)[38].
In response to these debates, the Federal Security Agency
(FSA) set up under the Surgeon General the National
Advisory Council on Leprosy. The Council discussed the
issues raised by the United Patients' Committee for Social
Improvement and Rehabilitation – composed of the
Patients' Federation, Veterans/Legionnaires, and the staff
of The Star (a monthly periodical published by the HD
patients) – which had expressed its objection to the Public
Health Services Act. Abolition of forced isolation and
detention and the broadening of outpatient treatment
services were discussed, but only the latter was sup-
ported[39]. After a while, an experimental project for out-
patient services was established in New Orleans.
Efforts to revise the law began soon after the enactment of
Public Health Services Act. In 1948, G. H. Rarey (US Army
– retired Colonel, national vice president of the American
Federation of the Physically Handicapped) and Paul Stra-
chan (president, American Federation for the Disabled)
drafted the National Leprosy Bill, and asked Congressman
Charles J. Kersten (R-Wisconsin) to submit it to Con-
gress[40]. In the following year, a similar bill, the
National Leprosy Act was submitted by Senator Claude D.
Pepper. Both of these draft legislation intended drastic
changes in leprosy control policy, including: dissemina-
tion of pertinent facts concerning leprosy (to promote an
enlightened public opinion, a new and more accurate
understanding of leprosy); treatment of leprosy patients
(to establish leprosy treatment principles, methods, and
regulations for administering leprosy treatment more in
harmony with the customs of society as applied to the care
and treatment of persons afflicted with other diseases; to
arrange treatment centers, both inpatient and outpatient
services); the National Advisory Council on Leprosy; reha-
bilitation and reemployment of leprosy patients; financial
assistance for leprosy patients and their dependents; com-
pensation for disability incident to leprosy; and expan-
sion of leprosy research.
At the Congressional hearings on the bills, the experts' tes-
timony took different positions[41]. As a drafter of the
bill, Colonel Rarey, who had served in the Philippine
Islands and encountered many leprosy patients, argued
insistently against the segregation of leprosy patients,
claiming that it was not effective, could destroy patients'
social lives, and might hinder patients from seekingBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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proper treatment. He stated, "Many cases of this disease
are not communicable. The remainders are classified by
leprologists as feebly communicable. The status and low
degree of communicability of leprosy in the US does not
justify continuance of the present compulsory segregation
policies." He also criticized the PHS, arguing that the FSA's
favoring of segregation erred on the ultraconservative side
of this question.
On the other side, J. Donald Kingsley, Acting Administra-
tor of the FSA, presented opposition to the bill. Although
he indicated sympathy with the basic objectives of the bill,
the necessity for law revision was denied. He argued that
most of the objectives of the bill could be more effectively
achieved through intensification of activities already
authorized by the existing law. The bill was criticized as
defective in attempting to divide responsibility for the
treatment and care of patients not hospitalized in PHS
hospitals, between the PHS and the various federal, state,
and local governmental agencies. Especially stressed was
the point that the proposed Act does not meet squarely
the problems of forced detention of leprosy patients: It
was insisted that the existing authority of the PHS should
not be repealed or cast in doubt without careful consider-
ation and provision for alternative methods of meeting
the problem, should need arise. The FSA, while recogniz-
ing the accumulating evidence showing the effectiveness
of the sulfone drugs, thus retained a conservative position.
The arguments of the FSA were accepted, and as a conse-
quence, those bills, though submitted repeatedly through
1954, were never enacted. The only leprosy-related legis-
lation passed in this period was a bill enacted in 1951,
which dealt with transportation costs for released
patients[42,43]. At the administrative level, however, a
series of changes was introduced. In 1946, patients were
given the right to vote. In 1947, the PHS removed HD
from the list of quarantinable diseases which required a
travel permit. In 1948, the barbed wire fence was removed
from the facility, and the first active patient was released
to the care of her private physician. In the same year, the
PHS officially recognized the name Hansen's disease as a
replacement for the term leprosy. In the 1950s, patients
were allowed to marry. Twelve negative monthly tests
were no longer required for discharge; instead those who
qualified for discharge were required to be financially sta-
ble and assure authorities that there were no children liv-
ing where they intended to go[44].
US period II (1950 until 1980)
In the early 1950s, patient isolation was criticized more
and more and eventually condemned at the International
Congress on Leprosy and at other international conven-
tions [45]. Following advice that the isolation of patients
should be limited to infectious cases, the abolition of
compulsory isolation was repeatedly recommended also
by WHO[46] and UNICEF[47]. Definition of the cases
suitable for temporary isolation gradually became deline-
ated[48].
In 1952, a decision was made that no administrator
should stay at the institution for more than three years.
Accordingly in 1953, the government appointed a new
director, Dr. Edward M. Gordon, a former director of the
PHS hospital in Chicago. Soon after his arrival, he
announced that those who did not need to be medically
hospitalized should leave the institution[49]. His policy
was that those able-bodied residents diagnosed as arrested
should be discharged; that discharge should be recom-
mended to those who were arrested and partially disa-
bled; that those who were disabled (blind or physically
handicapped) could stay in the institution, but could
leave if their relatives or friends offered appropriate care.
He also passed a rule prohibiting able-bodied residents
from working in the institution. Fearful of losing their
homes and jobs, some of the patients sent lawyers to
Washington to lobby elected officials[50]. After three
years, Dr. Gordon left for Fort Monroe in Virginia, and Dr.
Edgar B. Johnwick was appointed as the new director. In
1956, on the third day of his duty, Dr. Johnwick declared
before the patients that no one would be discharged from
the hospital against his/her will and that no one would be
kept in the hospital against his/her will[51].
During this period, scientists, while acknowledging the
clinical effects of sulfones and the distinction between
infectious types, were not unanimous in negating the util-
ity of patient isolation. Dr. L. F. Badger of Leprosy Control
Unit, the Communicable Disease Center (later, renamed
as Center for Disease Control), stressed in 1956 the
importance of isolation of infectious patients, as well as
the need for patient followup and continued treatment of
arrested cases[52]. Conversely, in 1958, Dr. Meyer, Medi-
cal Director at Carville, insisted that as disease control
measure, isolation is not necessary in many cases and has
serious defects[53]. No overt controversies were found
after that in the US literature. Meanwhile in 1960, the
World Health Organization advised against isolation and
in 1963 at the 8th International Leprosy Congress in Rio
de Janeiro, the International Leprosy Association recom-
mended against isolation and furthermore recommended
that leprosy needed no special care beyond that afforded
other communicable diseases[54].
The last compulsory isolation was reportedly enforced in
1960, and Part 32 of the Federal Code of Regulations
"Medical Care for Persons with Hansen's Disease and
Other Persons in Emergencies" dropped the term "deten-
tion" in 1975[55]. It should be noted that all these policy
changes were made through administrative action, not byBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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changing statutory law. Law revision was not visible on
the agenda as these policy changes proceeded. Even in
1974 when Hawaii ruled that all future new cases of the
disease would be treated as outpatients, no debate took
place on the federal level[56]. Compulsory isolation was
terminated as the practice of involuntary admission and
that of forced institutionalization ended.
US period III (Post 1980 through 2000)
The driving force to terminate the isolation policy legisla-
tively and abolish the leprosarium came not from new
medical findings but from arguments for economic effi-
ciency and budget cutting. In 1981, the Reagan adminis-
tration and Congress agreed that it no longer made sense
for the government to run public health hospitals, since
Medicare, Medicaid, and the general oversupply of hospi-
tals made specialized hospitals obsolete. A congressional
subcommittee, backed by the Omnibus Budget and Rec-
onciliation Act, thus targeted the nation's nine public
health hospitals, including the National Leprosarium at
Carville[57]. However, lobbied by the several groups
which had developed over the years to oppose termina-
tion – including the community of Carville, the patients,
a society of Legionnaires and veterans -, Congressman Gil-
lis Long fought for an exemption for Carville. Conse-
quently, the leprosarium survived the challenge based on
the argument that HD patients need special care and con-
siderations (The institution was renamed as Gillis Long
Hansen's Disease Center later in 1986)[58].
To the Congress, after 1981, Congressmen Henry A. Wax-
man and Gillis W. Long instead proposed a bill to change
HD policy. Avoiding the issue of closing down the Car-
ville institution, the bill was intended to permit treatment
of HD outside PHS facilities and to eliminate additional
pay for personnel treating HD. In the report attached to
the bill[59], Richard Ashbaugh (Acting Director, Bureau
of Medical Services, PHS) indicated the PHS's support for
the bill. He stated, "Leprosy pay ... was instituted because
of a mistaken belief that workers were at significant risk in
contracting Hansen's disease ... Not only is leprosy pay an
unjustifiable expense, it actually increases the stigma asso-
ciated with Hansen's disease." He went on to say, "The
PHS is strongly committed to the least restrictive possible
treatment of Hansen's disease ... " A similar act was sub-
mitted in the subsequent year, but also not enacted at least
in part because beneficiaries of the center's payroll,
including the patients working at the facility, made a
strong objection to the bill.
Without legislative support, the PHS had been subsidizing
ambulatory care centers for HD patients, outside the HD
Center since 1981. The PHS National Outreach Program
started 11 regional outpatient services nationwide[60].
When the PHS in 1983 did a formal review of the Center,
it issued a report which highlighted the Center's economic
inefficiency, making that the focal point of the discussion.
The Center at that time housed only 200 patients but com-
prised 98 buildings on 337 acres. The staff included 317
civil service and PHS workers and 125 part-time patient
employees. The PHS recommended that the Center con-
tinues its custodial care and research programs, but asked
for more outpatient clinics and a study of the elimination
of residential care. In the following year, the PHS set up a
utilization review committee in Carville to review period-
ically the conditions of patients who had been hospital-
ized more than two years, for their possible discharge
ability[61].
Finally, legislation was made. In 1985, PL99-117 was
enacted which stated the PHS ... "shall provide care and
treatment (including outpatient care) without charge ... to
any person suffering from Hansen's Disease who needs
and requests care and treatment for that disease"[62,63].
The term "detention" was deleted from the Act, though
the provision of residential care was not completely
negated. The hazardous duty salary supplements, while
had been reduced to one and one-quarter time, were dis-
continued for new hires.
In 1988, three years after the legislation, the PHS pub-
lished its report "Strategic Plan, National Hansen's Dis-
ease Center (NHDC)[64]." The plan reiterated the
situation of the NHDC, and evaluated whether it would
be cost effective and feasible to contract out the patient
care activities of the Center and transfer the research activ-
ities elsewhere. The report recommended expanding the
Center's mission to include other nerve-desensitizing dis-
eases, contracting out long-term patient care, and moving
the Center's research facilities to Baton Rouge. It also
argued the necessity of maintaining the Center so that
patients who had lived at Carville for decades could be
cared for compassionately in familiar surroundings. The
report reached the definitive conclusion that there should
be no new resident admitted to the Center, so that over
time the population would dwindle to nothing and the
entire facility could be closed. Accordingly in that same
year, Dr. John Duffy, a new director, began the move of
the Center's acute care, research and educational func-
tions to Baton Rouge, while allowing the current residents
to stay in Carville[65]. Thus, in practice, both voluntary
and involuntary isolation and hospitalization ended.
Nonetheless, despite these developments, closure of the
leprosarium required more than a decade, thwarting both
a 1990 plan to transform the institution into a geriatric
prison and a 1996 plan to make it a federal prison for
minimum security geriatric patients. The efficiency argu-
ment made by the PHS was always counterposed by the
equity and civil rights arguments offered by the patientsBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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and their allies. The patients, though demanding that
their basic human rights and freedom be restored,
claimed a right to lifelong care by the government[66].
Only the research branch was moved in 1992 to a location
at Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge.
Then, agenda was set again by the economic efficiency
argument, but this time with a new set of policy alterna-
tives. Representative Richard H. Baker proposed that the
site be used as a job training school, and that patients be
given an annual living subsidy if they departed[67]. Baker,
US District Judge Frank Polozola, and Jim Mitchell (PHS)
visited Carville to discuss with patients and staff members
the idea of closing the Center. This proposal was quashed
once when Congressman Cleo Field, who represented the
district from 1992 to 1996, objected. However, when the
1996 election returned the district of the Center (District
6 of Louisiana) to Baker, he resubmitted the bill with the
proposal that the site be transferred to the State of Louisi-
ana[68]. This time his plan was adopted.
PL 105-78, "Relocation of Gillis W. Long Hansen's Dis-
ease Center" was signed into law in 1997[69]. The legisla-
tion returned the physical facility to the State of Louisiana
without charge, though it specified that the Carville site
must be used for health or educational purposes for 30
years. It offered a voluntary separation incentive payment
to civil service employees. It directed that at or through the
Center, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services (DHHS) must provide short-term care
and treatment without charge, including outpatient care,
for Hansen's disease and related complications. The Secre-
tary, however, was not permitted to provide long-term
care for any disease or complication through the Center.
For long-term-care patients, the Secretary was instructed
to provide for long-term care without charge for the
remainder of the life of the patient. The bill also directed
the relocation of the patients at the Center to Baton Rouge
within three years unless such relocation was not feasible,
and it reassured the remainder that they could stay at Car-
ville as long as they were able to live independently. It fur-
ther offered a $33,000 annual stipend to any patient who
chose to leave the institution, and this irrevocable option
could be chosen at anytime by a patient. In August 1999,
the federal government transferred the leprosarium to the
State of Louisiana for use as a Job Corps training site. The
Louisiana National Guard initiated its Youth Challenge
program shortly after that[70]. Some patients left Carville
going either to the Baton Rouge facility or to the other
places, but quite a few remained. Today, the NHDC in
Baton Rouge admits about 180 HD patients, and treats
several hundred patients annually on an outpatient
basis[71].
Isolation of leprosy patients in Japan
Japan background
Since ancient times, historical records indicate, many HD
patients lacked permanent homes, leaving them to wan-
der around living in both towns and rural areas, and
sometimes creating their own colonies. Leprosy had been
understood to be a hereditary disease, but since the mid
19th century, the view that it was the result of a contagion
became known gradually, first among the medical experts,
and then among the public[72]. The recommendation of
the first International Conference on Leprosy held in Ber-
lin in 1897 led Japanese experts to support patient segre-
gation, although not always unanimously. A national
survey was conducted about leprosy, and Law No. 11,
"The Act on Leprosy Prevention," was passed in 1907. At
that time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) explained
that despite the mild infectiousness of leprosy, Law No.
11 was required for the sake of vagrant lepers, those with-
out means of support[73]. Five public leprosaria were
established by local governments in 1909. Voluntary
organizations and local governments launched the No
Leprosy Movement in 1924, which tried to find all leprosy
patients and send them to the leprosaria.
Subsequently, in 1931, the first national leprosarium was
opened, and at that time, Law No. 11 was revised to the
Leprosy Prevention Law, which allowed all patients,
whether they could be cared for at home or not, to be hos-
pitalized without any financial burden levied on their
families[74]. The Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW),
the successor of the MIA, nationalized all of the existing
leprosaria so as to coordinate their activities. Ministerial
officials issued manifests that leprosy should be eradi-
cated from Japan through absolute segregation[75]. In
accordance with the increasing institutional capacity of
leprosaria, the number of patients sent to leprosaria
increased considerably.
Japan period I (1940 through 1950s)
The sulfone drug Promin came to Japan in 1946 shortly
after WWII ended. Its significantly beneficial effects were
reported shortly at the Congress of the Japan Leprosy
Association[76]. However, many physicians remained
unconvinced of the real efficacy of the drug: They argued
that the disease could relapse, even though it might show
initial response[77,78]. The new drugs were difficult to
obtain either by import or by domestic production, but
patients were desperate to try them. They organized the
Federation of National Leprosarium Patients (FNLP) and
launched lobbying activities to acquire the drug. In
response, the Diet (the legislative body in Japan)
approved in 1950 a budget for sulfones. The drugs were
delivered to leprosaria, and, a year later, the first 35
patients were officially discharged as a result of their
improvement[79].BMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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Meanwhile after WWII, during the late 1940s and early
1950s, a new government was established in Japan, and
legal systems were thoroughly reviewed and revised in
compliance with the new Constitution. As part of that
process, leprosy wound up on the agenda in the Diet in
the early 1950s during discussions of social security sys-
tems. Debate went on until the revision of the existing law
of 1931.
On February 15, 1950, leprosarium directors Drs. Ken-
suke Mitsuda, Yoshinobu Hayashi, and Ryoichi Yajima
testified at the Health and Welfare Committee of the
House of Representatives, along with the Director of the
Medical Affairs Bureau, the MHW[80]. They insisted on
the necessity of continued isolation of leprosy patients,
argued for the desirability of the government subsidy for
Promin, and recommended the expansion of leprosaria.
On October 10, 1951, the Health and Welfare Committee
of the House of Councilors heard testimony from five
experts, including three leprosarium directors, Drs. Hay-
ashi (then also President of the Japan Leprosy Associa-
tion), Mitsuda and Miyazaki. Dr. Hayashi stressed the fact
that there were approximately 9000 institutionalized
patients, and 6000 outside the leprosaria who posed a
threat of infection. He argued that leprosaria should be
expanded to institutionalize all of the latter and that haz-
ardous pay (about 5–10% at that time) should be
increased as in the US. Dr. Mitsuda suggested that a more
stringent law should be implemented to require isolation
in order to prevent spread of the disease. He contended
that though the necessity of isolation is sometimes refuted
in the US, leprosy, regardless of its types, must be isolated
to prevent infection and that sterilization should be rec-
ommended to patients for this purpose. He stressed that
the new drugs, although promising in treatment, could
not be expected to eradicate leprosy. Dr. Miyazaki essen-
tially agreed with Dr. Mitsuda, adding that patients, many
of them with deformities and disabilities, could not be
released from leprosaria while they remained unaccepted
by society and unable to live outside. He suggested that
public enlightenment efforts would be advisable. The
other experts argued for expansion of research into lep-
rosy[81].
The bill to revise the Leprosy Prevention Law was submit-
ted as a cabinet bill in 1953. The Minister of Health and
Welfare explained to the House members that leprosy is
hard to cure, that patient isolation is the only measure
that prevents leprosy infection, and that the welfare of
patients and their families should be protected by the gov-
ernment. Masayoshi Yamaguchi, Director of Public
Health Bureau, the MHW, stated that patient isolation is
the sole measure for leprosy prevention and protection of
the public welfare, and that compulsory isolation should
be warranted by law as a last resort. He suggested that
patients might be discharged when leprosarium directors
consider their isolation unnecessary and recommended
that temporary leave also be allowed at the discretion of
directors[82]. Facing the possibility of more stringent
laws, the Patients' Federation expressed concern that the
prospective law under consideration was focused too nar-
rowly on social protection, while ignoring patients'
rights[83].
The revised Leprosy Prevention Law of 1953 was in
essence a reflection of the arguments of the experts and
maintained a legal basis for compulsory isolation of
patients proven to have bacilli and for prohibition of
leave without permission. In response to patients' pleas,
nine supplementary resolutions were adopted, including
provisions for living stipends and patient work, improve-
ment in living conditions, promotion of research, and
installation of rehabilitation facilities. The MHW did ini-
tiate programs for patient rehabilitation, but the Ministry
was still devising a plan to expand leprosaria capacity to
hospitalize leprosy patients. The Notice of the Vice-Minis-
ter, issued soon after the promulgation of the Law, still
described isolation as the only reliable means of preven-
tion of the spread of the disease. A tentative standard for
discharge was officially detailed by the MHW in 1956, but
it was stated as not being intended to facilitate dis-
charge[84]. In practice, about 500 patients were admitted
or readmitted to leprosaria in 1956, while fewer than 100
were discharged.
Japan period II (1960s through 1980s)
In 1961, the legislature of the government of the Ryukyu
Islands, then under the auspices of the US army, took a
major step when it passed the Hansen's Disease Preven-
tion Act. It provided that the Chief Executive may advise
hospitalization and may also order an improved patient
to leave the hospital[85]. Inspired by the policies of the
Ryukyu Islands and acquainted with the international rec-
ommendation that most leprosy patients should be
treated on an outpatient basis, thus abolishing compul-
sory isolation, the Patients' Federation (FNLP) repeatedly
voiced support for revision of the Leprosy Prevention Law
of 1953[86]. They repeatedly insisted that the Law lacked
a scientific basis and violated human rights, and argued
that they were victims of enforced segregation and of
social stigmas fostered by the Law[87]. In 1963, the
Patients' Federation filed its petition for the revision of the
Law, sending more than 200 patients to pressure the Diet
and the MHW.
Despite these efforts, the Diet did not add revision of the
Leprosy Prevention Law to its agenda. The MHW officials
argued that the existing law legitimized compulsory isola-
tion of leprosy patients, which in turn constituted the
legal basis for the government's responsibility to provideBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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them with care and a comfortable living environment.
Revision of the Law might eliminate the leprosaria, mak-
ing it impossible for the patients to live on public support.
Overt transition of leprosy control to an outpatient basis
could also lead to a similar outcome. It was also argued
that the transformation of leprosaria from medical facili-
ties to rehabilitation facilities would be difficult because
of budget constraints[88]. Concerned about the future of
leprosaria, patients did not have the unanimity necessary
for law revision. A 1965 survey disclosed that only 16% of
patients had an intention to be discharged in the future
while the rest felt that they were unable or unwilling to
leave their leprosaria[89].
Leprosarium directors in Japan gradually relaxed the
implementation of the law. Patients became increasingly
free to leave their leprosaria, and abscondments were not
punished after the 1960s. In addition, treatment began to
be offered outside leprosaria, although on an informal
outpatient basis[90]. Concerned that law revision could
eventually harm patients' welfare, patients, as well as the
officials in charge, came to pay more attention to improv-
ing the leprosaria and providing other benefits for
patients. The preservation of the Law was implicitly justi-
fied as a way to guarantee patients' welfare.
In May 1972, the Ryukyu Islands, where leprosy treatment
was based on outpatient services, were returned to Japan.
This return again focused the attention of both patients
and medical professionals on policy issues. In 1976, when
the Federation of Leprosarium Directors drafted a revision
proposal which incorporated specific discharge codes,
and then submitted it to patients for their consideration,
the Patients' Federation objected to the proposal based on
the concern that the adoption of specific discharge codes
could result in forced discharge[91]. As was seen in the
1960s, many patients remained hesitant to address the
issue of law revision, and their movements focused more
on compensation for low-wage patient labor and redress-
ing the long-term compulsory segregation of the past. A
decade later, in 1984, the Patients' Federation itself cre-
ated a committee to examine revision of the Law, but con-
tinued to be concerned about the fate of their adopted
homes, the leprosaria[92]. Consequently, the Federation
of Leprosarium Directors only directed that leprosaria
should not be abruptly discontinued as many of their res-
idents were already too old to leave.
The MHW endeavored to improve living conditions in
national leprosaria in response to repeated pleas filed by
patients, as well as discussions in the Diet. Medical staff-
ing was increased, patient labor was gradually reduced or
made more rewarding, and government allowances were
increased for leprosaria and their patients[93]. Officials
did warn patients of the possibility that the numbers and
sizes of leprosaria could be reduced as part of administra-
tive reform if revisions to the Law were implemented too
quickly.
Japan period III (1980s through 2000)
When Fujio Otani became the Director General of the
Tofu Kyokai Foundation, which had been established to
serve patients with leprosy, the stalemate in policy change
began to resolve. Otani was a medical officer in the MHW,
and had been Chief of the Section of National Hospitals
and Sanatoria in the 1970s, and Director General of Med-
ical Affairs Bureau in the early 1980s. Recruited to the
Foundation after his retirement, he also served as the
Chairman of the Advisory Council on Public Health in the
MHW. Since the recommendation in the mid 1980s of the
UN Commission on Human Rights to improve psychiat-
ric treatment in Japan, Otani had been inspired to act for
the protection and restoration of human rights among
patients[94]. In 1989, when the Patients' Federation con-
sulted with him on its draft petition on the law, he began
to commit himself to the issue of law revision.
In 1992, encouraged by Otani, the Patients' Federation
filed a petition with the Minister of Health and Welfare.
Although many patients still worried about the fate of
their leprosaria, Otani promised them that their homes
would be maintained[95]. In the following year, the Tofu
Kyokai Foundation was officially consulted by the Minis-
try on the prevention policy for leprosy. A committee was
established, composed of leprologists, medical experts,
lawyers, media representatives, bureau officials and
patients, and presided over by Otani. He tried to appeal to
public opinion by establishing the Museum of Hansen's
Disease (MHD) and hosting a series of symposia about
the policies on HD[96]. In 1994 at the 67th Congress of
the Japan Leprosy Association (JLA), Otani gave a special
lecture and stated that the existing Leprosy Prevention
Law should be abolished since it was not scientifically jus-
tifiable and violated patients' human rights. Six months
later, as a result, the Federation of Leprosarium Directors
and the JLA publicly confirmed his opinion that the exist-
ing law should be abolished[97].
Upon the release of the report by the MHW committee in
1995, the MHW organized an internal panel of experts on
the abolishment of the Leprosy Prevention Law. This
panel, again chaired by Otani, subsequently submitted its
report which recommended abolition of the Law, contin-
ued provision of public support for existing patients, and
the use of the term "Hansen's disease" in place of "lep-
rosy" in laws and regulations. Finally in 1996, the "Act to
Abolish the Leprosy Prevention Law," drafted by the
MHW, was passed. It abolished the 1953 Law and at the
same time codified the government's responsibility to
provide existing HD patients with continuous medicalBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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and other social services. It was also provided that patients
could either leave the leprosaria or stay there as long as
they wished, and that those who decided to come back to
the leprosaria after their discharge could be readmitted.
At the time of the abolition of the old law, there were
5,413 patients in leprosaria, whose average length of stay
was more than 40 years and whose average age was 72
years old. Only six of these patients actually left their lep-
rosaria in the following two years[98]. In response to law-
suits filed in the late 1990s, in 2001 the court awarded
financial settlements to those who had been isolated
under the earlier laws[99]. The awards amounted to
between $65,000 and $114,000 per person depending on
the degree of suffering. Additional pay to the workers at
leprosaria was preserved.
Discussion
This study demonstrates that the isolation of leprosy
patients was introduced and made rigorous in both coun-
tries around the time when it became known that the dis-
ease was contagious. Patient isolation policies and
leprosaria were maintained long after it became known
that isolation is not necessary in the majority of cases.
Remarkable was the stagnation of policy change in the
post-war period. The preservation of the isolation policy
provided patients with some social support, but continu-
ously deprived them of their civil liberties. Furthermore,
the policy as an authoritative statement on the disease
may have fostered the social stigma associated with a
belief that the disease is a dreadful contagion, thereby
maintaining a hurdle to patients' reintegration into soci-
ety. Evidently, the policy's abolition was not easily accom-
plished nor was achieved solely by advances in scientific
knowledge.
Garbage Can model of policy making
Kingdon's Garbage Can model is very useful in under-
standing the failure of 'appropriate' policy termination, as
well as its delayed termination, observed in both coun-
tries: Any policy has an inertia and efforts to abolish the
patient isolation policy did not bear fruit until three
streams, i.e., problem, policy, and politics, converged after
the mid-1980s. Science, although presumably a potent
factor, was not in itself a major driving force in opening a
policy window.
In the early post-WWII period (late 1940s through 1950s)
both in the US and Japan, scientific developments such as
learning that the infectiousness of leprosy is usually feeble
and uneven across disease types and the development of
sulfone drugs effective against the disease might have
been expected to be the major factor in reconsideration of
the traditional isolation and institutional policy for lep-
rosy management. In reality, however, the laws were
revised, not as a result of the scientific developments, but
as a spillover from other policy agendas: the enactment of
the Public Health Services Act in the US, and the revision
of social security systems in Japan, without substantial
policy changes. Once legislated, they could hardly be chal-
lenged.
Most actors then participating in the policy discussion
were well aware of the new drugs, and patients were anx-
ious to reap the fruits of these drugs and achieve the resto-
ration of their civil liberties, sometimes participating in
political mobilization for law revision. Scientific and
medical advances could have altered the face of issues in
the problem stream, helped generate alternative methods
of disease management in the policy stream, and changed
the opinion of the public and experts in the political
stream. However, many influential experts, who had been
engaged in the establishment and/or expansion of lepro-
saria were determined to keep the policy and the institu-
tions and played on remaining public fear of
leprosy[100]. Those conservative "elites", primarily
bureaucratic agency representatives in the US and medical
professionals in Japan, manifested opposition to the pro-
posed law revision, and their arguments were not critically
reviewed and more or less accepted by the other actors.
Consequently, science and medicine were unable to play
a major role in changing the political environment. For
these reasons, a valuable opportunity for legislative
change was lost in this period when patients were still
young and had not become so dependent on their sanato-
ria in both countries.
After the unsuccessful exploitation of these incomplete
policy windows, the three streams of problems, policies
and politics did not converge for several decades. By the
late 1960s, it could be said that a near consensus had
developed in the research community that isolation was
an unreasonable solution. Moreover, the infringement of
civil liberties was perceived to be a problem, a perception
which increased in importance as academics and interna-
tional health communities repeatedly recommended the
abolition of isolation policy as scientifically unjustifiable.
In the problem stream, focusing events were created by
patients, administrators and medical professionals with
the goal of encouraging the public and politicians to put
the issue on the agenda. Most obviously, patients pub-
lished periodicals, invited media persons to their meet-
ings, petitioned bureaucracies, and lobbied legislators in
both countries. In Japan, patients even conducted sit-ins
around the Diet and the Ministerial buildings. The
repeated recommendations of international organiza-
tions, and the occasional official reports recommending
outsourcing and outpatient services, also served as
focuses. In the political stream, there were some changesBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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as well. As the public's fear of leprosy dwindled (or at least
became latent as they forget about the disease), so did the
associated stigma. Improved public attitudes toward the
disease meant that the political climate was more favora-
ble to returning the patients to society, terminating the
isolation policy, and abolishing leprosaria. In both coun-
tries, there were periodic turnovers of leprosaria directors,
sometimes recruited from outside the leprosaria. The
appointment of leprosaria directors from other public
hospitals and academic institutions, who had the inten-
tion to discharge the long-term residents, certainly could
have opened a window.
Every time the issue reached the agenda, however, the pro-
posed policy alternatives raised concerns among patients.
Treating leprosy as an ordinary disease and integrating
treatment into general medical care and public health
measures threatened the 'special' status of leprosy. Many
patients, who had become dependent on the leprosaria,
feared losing their homes and privileges. If from a scien-
tific perspective the disease no longer required isolation,
patients sought to justify their continued privileges either
as government duty to provide disease victims with com-
passionate care or as government compensation for past
erroneous policies. Such patients' claims were not easily
accepted. Given the lack of a public consensus on the
moral underpinnings for patient support, the belief that
long-term residents are entitled to generous government
"compensation" was a hurdle. To surmount that hurdle,
administrators and medical professionals would have had
to acknowledge their wrongdoing and determine when
the isolation policy could and should have been judged as
obsolete. Additionally, public opinion, and of course the
views of elected officials, would have needed to be nur-
tured to recognize and sympathize with patients' adversar-
ies, allowing for generous government payments. As a
result, the position of the patients was not really unified,
and therefore they could not fully mobilize themselves
politically. Consequently, this policy community more or
less shared the view that the patients' disadvantages
caused by the law were a necessary cost of its even greater
benefits, namely the continuation of leprosaria[101].
When it proved impossible to accomplish decisive legisla-
tive changes, straightforward efforts to discharge long-
term and medically unwarranted residents were also
reduced. Instead policy adjustments were made by incre-
mental administrative actions. Slow, limited and some-
times informal efforts were made for patients' discharge
and for the provision of outpatient services. As one might
expect[102,103], these disjointed and informal incre-
ments of change had limited success in modifying the pol-
icy's original effect. Since the policy under the existing law
was administered on the premise that leprosy requires
confinement and special care, it was limited in its capacity
to compel patients to leave the leprosaria. As many
patients chose to remain in their leprosaria, isolation
ostensibly continued in the form of long-term residential
care. In this way, the main focus of leprosy prevention
policy gradually changed from social protection and
patient care to the mere provision of residential places for
patients and ex-patients (and later, rehabilitative serv-
ices). These bureaucratic satisficing behaviors, as reported
in other cases[104,105], could not raise again the funda-
mental question of law revision, and as a consequence
many engaged themselves in pork barrel politics to pre-
serve and improve life in the leprosaria. For many years,
policy (change) focused on discrete, short-term outputs
rather than broader, long-range outcomes[106].
In the 1980s, broad policy revision became possible again
though the agendas were set by factors again other than
science, specifically the discussion on economic ineffi-
ciency in the US and the issue of human rights violation
in Japan. In the former, large government expenditure was
a big social and political issue, and there was an active
search for potentials for spending cuts. In the latter, AIDS
as a source of social stigmas and the forced institutionali-
zation of psychiatric patients were both prominent in the
media, calling for the protection of the human rights of
the diseased. Furthermore, as Bardach suggested[107],
increased political competition and Cabinet turnover at
that time may also have increased the likelihood that
elected officials would take up potential social issues to be
remedied. In the US, Representatives Baker and Field
fought for a House seat, while in Japan the two major par-
ties competed vigorously for government office.
An indispensable key to policy change was the develop-
ment of policy alternatives. Interestingly, they were quite
common in both countries. Evidently, policy change
occurred only after the leprosaria were recognized as legit-
imate homes for some patients and outpatient services
were officially established. Patients were assured of their
residences, but had the option of leaving the institutions.
The patient's privilege of remaining in a leprosarium was
then justified as partial compensation for the past com-
pulsory segregation. In both countries, hazard duty pay-
ments were also maintained for ongoing employees, who
could have otherwise opposed to policy changes. The pri-
mary difference, as reflective of the key arguments against
the old policy, i.e., economic inefficiency and human
rights violation, was that in Japan a public apology was
offered by the government for its long-term negligence,
though the apology was later used by the patients to win
further government compensation through lawsuits.
Another point is that in the US, large stipends were
awarded to patients as an economic incentive to reduce
the number of institutional residents.BMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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The functions of science and scientists in the policy process
From the perspective of the Garbage Can model, prob-
lems, policies and politics typically evolve in separate,
unconnected streams. When science is considered as a
fourth factor, it is seen to influence all the streams, chang-
ing perception of problems, helping develop policies, and
transforming political environments[108]. Thus, science
can be seen as approving or disapproving certain (exist-
ing) policies. However, it does not automatically create
those effects by itself, nor in a political vacuum. Even
when science indicates that an existing policy is no longer
relevant, as this case study shows, people may make objec-
tions to its abolition for a variety of other reasons. In com-
parison with basic research, furthermore, applied
research, including public health and epidemiological
research, is more likely to follow an agenda driven by
forces other than science[109]. This means that the immi-
nence of an issue, or its agenda status, can affect the pro-
duction and use of scientific knowledge.
Furthermore, scientific disputes will not be always
resolved during the time the scientific issues are consid-
ered relevant to policy discussions[110]. Looking back at
Period I, Promin was first mentioned in Leprosy Review in
1945, but it was not until 1952 that sulfone therapy
became accepted among academics[111,112]. Contro-
versy on the effectiveness of sulfone drugs certainly still
lingered at the time when the legislative changes were on
the agenda, namely, around the time of the enactment of
the Public Health Services Act and subsequent policy pro-
posals in the US and at the time of the revision of Leprosy
Prevention Law in Japan. The development and accept-
ance of scientific knowledge might have been slowed by
the attitudes of authoritative and powerful experts in
Japan. Also, in the US, quite a few experts continued to
justify the isolation of infectious cases for many years.
Arguments that did not support their convictions were
sometimes screened out by disqualifying them. Authorita-
tive positions of medical and administrative elites in soci-
ety also hindered the public's critical appraisal of their
arguments, as did the importance then attached to public
health[113]. The strength of the conservatives' arguments
possibly came also from the systemic bias in their position
as defenders of status quo: they had to simply attack a pro-
poser's case as insufficient[114].
In an adversarial process of rule-making, knowledge
claims are sometimes deconstructed, exposing areas of
weakness or uncertainty. These revealed weaknesses pro-
vide justification for political decision makers to assert
that they have a right to engage in interpreting science,
especially in areas that are controversial. Again, uncer-
tainty within science itself is also a subject for negotiation,
decision, and argument in policy process, since the quality
and amount of knowledge are the objects of social nego-
tiation[115]. This partial transfer of cognitive authority to
the legal and political arena may be seen as the way of
assuring that the interpretation of (indeterminate) facts
reflects the public values embodied in the legislation as
well as the norms of the scientific community[116]. The
connections between given scientific data, expert interpre-
tation of these data and policy content are like chains of
linked arguments and beliefs[117]. This process might be
termed co-evolution or the process of mutual validation
between policy and science[118]. In a case where science
and policy are co-constructed through processes which
occur in tandem, it becomes difficult to explain the one by
using the other[119]. From the vantage point of history,
the very absence or scarcity of critical review among legis-
lators and the public in reviewing scientists' statements on
the risk of disease spread might reflect and indicate their
own fear of the disease and indifference to patients'
human rights. When scientific knowledge is used in policy
development, scientists and/or policymakers may choose
to err either on the side of public safety or on that of
patients' liberty and dignity.
For a long portion of Period II, incomplete knowledge was
not necessarily the primary reason why science did not
play a major role. Scientists, experts and legislators could
have acted strategically as policy entrepreneurs to take
advantage of occasional opportunities, provided by sev-
eral focusing events, to open the windows of opportunity.
In other words, scientific opposition, or dissensus if any,
was not a major hindrance to their actions. Scientists,
however, preferred not to encroach upon policy debates
in an official and overt fashion, thus avoiding direct ques-
tions about justification and continuation of the institu-
tions. In both countries during the 1960s and 1970s, there
was a near consensus, albeit implicit among the interested
parties, including scientists, physicians, bureaucrats,
patients and politicians, that the leprosaria should be pre-
served or at least not immediately abolished. Though sci-
entific assessment appeared conclusive and potent
enough if effectively presented, consideration for the pos-
sible negative consequences of policy outcomes con-
strained its use. In the resultant incremental decision
making, the demand for science was minimal.
Later in period III, when development of policy alterna-
tives was definitely the key to changing policies, the proc-
ess was not fueled by (new) scientific knowledge or
discussion, but rather propelled by political skills which
crafted both the policies and the favorable environments.
A scientific consensus had already existed before the issue
was taken up at this point, which illustrates the secondary
importance of science in the emergence of policy win-
dows. At most, the known arguments were reiterated and
pushed to the fore. Policy change was not really contested
and disputed in terms of science, simply because it did notBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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have to be once attractive policy alternatives were pro-
posed.
From this vantage in all the periods, science remained
instrumental in the sense that scientific rationality was
not the primary objective for which policy change was dis-
cussed or intended, and in the sense that scientific argu-
ments were not the principal driving force for policy
change. To review the course of events: Some initiating
event, not directly associated science, leads to a policy
issue that must be decided on; a debate ensues on the pos-
sible policy options and on possible scientific views of the
issue; a scientific assessment of the policy issue yields a
rationale for a policy choice[120,121]. Thus, science is
used either to legitimate policies developed for nonscien-
tific reasons or is ignored if the consensus contradicts pol-
icy or there is scientific "dissensus." To the extent which
science can be regarded as instrumental, namely that final
policy decision was rendered to lawmakers, the role and
responsibility of science could decrease[122]. The scien-
tific base and the political will to translate it to policy are
ingredients necessary to induce policy changes[123-125].
Inertia and/or political considerations certainly exerted
huge influence[126].
Policy entrepreneurs and leadership
Although many contextual conditions could facilitate
changes in health policies, they do not in themselves acti-
vate actions by either legislators or administrators[127-
129]. As is the case with policy adoption[130,131], suc-
cessful termination might need a political leader, a termi-
nator, to trigger and manage effectively the process of
policy termination. He must cultivate support from both
influential interest groups and from the general public
and choose the arena for policy discussions[132-134].
Then, a person skilled in policy termination should get
the termination on the agenda, orchestrate advocacy coa-
litions, negate the survival tactics of anti-termination coa-
litions, and manage the administrative details[135-138].
With respect to HD policy, for a long period, intellectual
reluctance, the tendency to institutional permanence,
dynamic conservatism, efficacious anti-termination coali-
tions, and legal obstacles certainly posed difficulties for
policy changes in both countries[139,140]. After a set of
these contextual conditions were met, however, entrepre-
neurs had to accomplish their tasks. A crucial step for pol-
icy termination, namely the translation of ideas into
action by coupling concrete and acceptable policy propos-
als with problem situations and political opportunities,
was accomplished by a policy termination
expert[141,142].
When things proceed as the Garbage Can model suggests,
policy change requires a good luck and/or a skillful policy
entrepreneur, who can induce the convergence of streams
and open the windows of opportunity. This study high-
lighted an essential role assumed by a skillful terminator,
Baker in the US and Otani in Japan. In the US, Represent-
ative Baker, along with the PHS officials, held meetings
with the patients and staffs at the institution so that all
interested parties could reach agreement on his proposals.
The PHS publicized its own review of the institution and
its activities highlighting their economic inefficiency. In
this way, Baker and the PHS maneuvered the political
process to successful legislation enactment. In Japan,
Otani dramatized the evils of the old policy, stressing the
benefits of termination, while mollifying the worried
patients by reassuring of their continued residence in the
sanatoria. He thus successfully engineered a consensus
among key interest groups, publicizing a thorough justifi-
cation for termination and devising an acceptable plan.
Through political leadership and skill, the issue was
finally brought to the forefront, alternatives supplied,
obstacles cleared, and the policy abolished. Both Baker
and Otani conducted a series of bandwagon activities
making effective use of the media.
Conclusion
Quarantine measures aim to protect the health and safety
of the public, and consequently individual liberty is sub-
ordinate to the common good[143]. Parens patriae, the
obligation of the state to act as parent of the country in
caring for those who cannot care for themselves, is the
other side of the duty of the state to protect the rest of the
community from infected individuals[144]. The human
rights or civil liberties of patients must be weighed the
effectiveness and efficacy of the isolation measure. It is
inarguable that science could and should play a key part.
The utilization of scientific knowledge contributes to
increased rationality of health policy, which is desirable
especially when incongruence could produce adverse
effects. However, when policy changes occur as a result of
the convergence of three largely independent streams of
problems, policies and politics, we cannot assume a
rational and linear process which automatically incorpo-
rates science into policy. As discussed, a variety of dynam-
ics influence the utilization of scientific research in
policymaking[145-147]. For policies to be reflective of sci-
ence, these models suggest, the interactions among
researchers and policy makers are critical. Research is
more likely to be utilized in a significant way when effec-
tive networks and mechanisms are established at the inter-
faces among researchers and policy makers[148].
However, even that may not be sufficient.
Events in the various streams should be made readily
understandable and visible, either in hopes of a serendip-
itous convergence or so that policy entrepreneurs can
assist in their convergence, in order to open the windowBMC International Health and Human Rights 2005, 5:3 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-698X/5/3
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of opportunity. Problems should be foregrounded, politi-
cal factors should be elucidated, and feasible and attrac-
tive policy alternatives should be envisioned. Experts
should be mobilized to assume authoritative roles in link-
ing science and policy, though it should always be noted
that they too could be biased in one way or another. Polit-
ical empowerment of the people who suffer from the neg-
ative policy outcomes, and therefore might be most
attentive to them, could also help serve the purpose.
Policy is always developed both from scientific and non-
scientific considerations, as this study indicated. The Pos-
sibilities for the instrumental use and/or disuse of science
should be made explicit to the public. Mobilization of dif-
ferent social views and values, in comprehensive consid-
eration of direct and indirect policy impacts, could lead to
a more explicit and formal social process, which could
eventually secure and propel the process of muddling
through[149]. Public governance over these processes,
along with public's enlightenment and mobilization,
might facilitate, check and complement the functions ful-
filled by the experts. Analysis of policy and politics is the
indispensable key to these processes.
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